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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

VERA S. KING,

J

Plaintiff and Respondent, f
vs.

\

F. F. HINTZE,

No. 8071

\
Defendant and Appellant. I

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

Introduction
This case was tried before a jury in the court of the
Hon. Ray Van Cott. After the completion of the evidence, Judge
Van Cott instructed the jury that the evidence established a
breach of contract on the part of the defendant and that the
defendant had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to constitute a defense to said breach. The jury was therefore instructed that they should return a verdict of nominal damages
for the plaintiff and that they should take under consideration
3
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the matter of compensatory damages. The jury returned a
verdict of 6c nominal damages and $4500.00 compensatory
damages. From that verdict this appeal was taken by the defendant. As the plaintiff does not agree in its entirety with the
Statement of Fact contained in the Brief of the appellant, we
will here set forth at some detail the facts as we feel the record
shows them to be.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime prior to the year 1950, Mrs. Vera S. King and
Edwin G. Kidder had jointly acquired a mining lease and
option on four patented mining claims and one unpatented
mining claim located in the White Pine Mining District, White
Pine County, State of Nevada. These claims were known as
the Ora, West Onetha, the Onetha, the Milwaukee, and the
Cedar Ridge No. 1. Mining operations had been in progress
for some time on the Ora and Onetha claims (T. 15). The
evidence contains the settlement sheets on the ore which had
been removed from these claims previous to the 24th day
of June, 1950 (Ex. 4). In the late fall of 1949 one P. C. Reynolds, acting on behalf of Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder, employed a Mr. Casselli, a mining engineer residing in the state
of Nevada, to locate some mining claims surrounding the
claims covered by the mining lease and option above mentioned (T. 16-19). Casselli proceeded to file location notices
on 17 claims surrounding the claims covered by the mining
lease and option. As winter closed in shortly after the location
notices were filed, the location work on these claims was not
4
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done in the winter of 1949 and 1950, and had not been done
on the 24th day of June, 1950, when the agreement, which is
the subject of this law suit, was entered into between Mr.
Kidder and Mrs. King, on the one hand, and F. F. Hintze,
on the other (T. 20). However, no intervening rights had
been filed.
Mr. F. F. Hintze is a mining engineer who has long been
connected with the mining department of the University of
Utah. He was associated in business with Kidder. In the spring
of 1950, Hintze went to New York City where he talked to
some people interested in putting money in a mining venture
in the West (T. 202). Hintze evidently knew about the KidderKing properties from his association with Kidder. Upon his
return to Salt Lake City, Hintze contacted Kidder regarding
acquiring the mining lease and option above mentioned and
the unpatented claims which are above discussed. Kidder expressed his willingness (T. 193-195). Thereupon Hintze contacted Mrs. King to determine whether or not she was willing to sell her interest in these claims (T-170-173). Mrs.
King considered the matter for a day or two and then advised
Hintze that she v^as willing. Accordingly, Hintze drew up the
agreement and the assignment which is the subject of this
law suit (T. 22). Mrs. King went to Hintze's office and there
signed the agreement. Kidder signed at the same time.
As is stated in the statement of facts in appellant's brief,
this agreement constituted an assignment to Hintze of the
mining lease and option which Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder
owned. In exchange for this, Hintze agreed to form a corporation and to convey to Kidder and Mrs. King, in exchange
5
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for the mining lease and option, 1,250,000 shares of stock
of a par value of 10c per share in said corporation to be
formed. The agreement also provided that Mrs. King and
Mr. Kidder would execute and deliver to Hintze or to the
company to be organized by him a Quit Claim Deed to the
unpatented mining claims mentioned above and also to the
Charter Oak, a patented claim, and one-third interest in the
Monitor Reindeer Survey, also a patented claim. The evidence
indicates that Hintze never did follow through on the location and development work on the unpatented mining
claims. However, he did proceed to re-locate them, not in
the name of Kidder and King, but in his own name (T. 132,
160). The evidence is undisputed that Hintze never formed
the corporation.
I. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE TERMS OF
THE AGREEMENT BY KIDDER AND KING.
(a) THE MINING LEASE AND OPTION WERE IN
GOOD STANDING.
In his appeal to this court the defendant, Hintze, has
based his entire case on an alleged deficiency in the location
work on the unpatented mining claims. He has raised no
question on appeal as to the status of the case and option,
although in the court below and in all the correspondence
which appears in evidence, his original assigned reason for
failing to go through with the contract was that the lease
and option were in default. Evidently the evidence was so
overwhelming on this point that it has been abandoned by
Hintze. The respondent brings the point up here only because
6
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of the danger that in concentrating only on the unpatented
mining claims, their importance in this transaction will be
exaggerated.
As is stated above Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder held a lease
and option on the Ora, the Onetha and the Milwaukee claims.
These were patented claims on which there was an operating
mine. The unpatented mining claims in question had no
mine workings on them at all. They surrounded the claims
which were subject of the lease and option and were considered
of value in the matter only for the purpose of protecting the
working claims. Mr. E. W. Newman, a mining engineer employed by American Smelting and Refining Company, was
called as a witness by the plaintiff to place a value on the
properties conveyed by Kidder and King to Hintze. Mr. Newman stated that in his opinion the total properties, i. e. the
lease and option on the working claims and the unpatented
claims surrounding them, were worth a minimum of $25,000.00 on a cash deal or a maximum of $50,000.00 on an
option deal. On cross-examination the defendant asked Mr.
Newman to break this figure of $25,000.00 down as between
the lease and option, which was purchased, and the unpatented
claims surrounding them. Mr. Newman stated that he was
unable to break the figure down. However, he did state that
in arriving at his minimum figure of $25,000.00 he had given
major consideration to the lease and option (T. 78). He stated
that the showings from the Ora mine were very favorable.
He stated that he had not even inspected the grounds on
which the unpatented mining claims were located and had
assigned value to them only because they surrounded and
7
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protected the claims subject to the lease and option which
were actually being worked. Therefore, the court should keep
in mind that even if it were true, as we deny, that the plaintiff
had no property interest in the unpatented mining claims, still
there was no failure of consideration under the contract because of the fact that the major element of value in the
conveyance from Kidder and King to Hintze was the mining
lease and option on the operating mine, which the defendant
evidently now admits was in good standing as he has raised
in this court no question as to its validity.
(b) THE PLAINTIFF HAD A PROPERTY RIGHT IN
THE UNPATENTED MINING CLAIMS WHICH COULD
BE CONVEYED BY QUIT CLAIM DEED.
The appellant's entire appeal is based upon his contention
that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder had no right at all in the unpatented mining claims and that there was therefore a breach
in the contract on their part which excused performance on
his part. His entire brief is devoted to this point. Even if
Hintze's position that Kidder and King had no property right
in the unpatented mining claims were true, that would still
not constitute a defense to the action by Hintze for reasons
that will be discussed in the next succeeding section. However,
because respondent does not wish the court to feel that we
acknowledge this point to be well taken, we wish to discuss
the matter here.
Evidently the contention of the appellant in regard to
the unpatented claims was raised by him in the case as an
after thought. The evidence shows that he was approached
8
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a number of times regarding the formation of the corporation,
and always excused his non-performance on the ground that
he was busy, that he did not have sufficient money, and later
on the ground that the lease and option was in default.
Never, at any time up to the time this action was brought did
he raise the point that there was anything wrong with the
unpatented mining claims. There is in evidence correspondence
between Mrs. King and Hintze and between counsel in this
case. Hintze attempts to justify his failure to form a corporation, but nowhere in this correspondence does there appear
any reference to any invalidity of the unpatented mining
claims. Furthermore, in his answer, which was filed on the
18th day of August, 1952, Hintze does not raise any question
as to the unpatented mining claims. The sole defense set
forth in the Answer and Counterclaim is that the mining
lease and option was in default, which position he has now
abandoned. It was not until 8 months later, on the 28th
day of April, 1953', just 20 days before this case came to trial,
that the defendant filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim in which he raised for the first time the question as to
the questionable character of the unpatented mining claims.
Hintze certainly was never mislead by Mrs. King as to
the condition of these unpatented mining claims. The testimony is undisputed that Mrs. King did not approach Mr.
Hintze on the matter but that he approached her. Furthermore,
Hintze admits that no representation as to these claims was
made by Mrs. King. Reynolds testified, without contradiction,
that prior to the time that Hintze prepared the contract here
in question, he, Reynolds had told Hintze just what had been

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

done in regard to the unpatented claims. Certainly, therefore,
Hintze, an experienced mining man, could not have been mislead. Furthermore, the evidence is undisputed that immediately
after the contract was signed, Hintze rather than carrying
through on the locations filed in the name of Kidder and
King the previous fall, elected to make new filings on the
property in his own name, which he did proceed to do. Therefore, even if we were to take the position that the location
notices filed by King and Kidder were invalid because of
the length of time that had run without the location work
being done, still that would not be available to Hintze as
a reason for not going ahead with the formation of the corporation as there had been no intervening claims filed and
Hintze immediately after the signing of the contract, posted
location notices on the land in his own name and could have
followed through with the location work had he elected to
do so.
The appellant has quoted at length from statutes of the
United States and statutes of the state of Nevada relative
to the location of lode mining claims. We see no purpose in
restating the statutes here, but will refer to them by number
as they appear in the brief of the appellant. The United
States laws require (30 U.S.C.A. 28) that the location of a lode
mining claim must be distinctly marked on the ground so
that its boundaries can be readily traced. With this requirement, Mr. Casselli complied in filing the location for Mrs.
King and Mr. Kidder. He did erect monuments on the ground
and on each monument placed a can and in this can placed the
description by metes and bounds of the claim in question.
10
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There is no requirement in the federal law that the four
corners of the claim must be actually marked on the ground,
nor is this requirement found in the laws of many states. The
laws of the state of Nevada, Sec. 4121, do require that the
corners be marked. However, in this regard, it may be well
to review the steps necessary to locate and patent a lode mining
claim. The first step which is taken is the filing of a location,
which is done by the erecting of a monument and by the
placing on the monument a description of the claim the name
of the claimant and other pertinent information. Under the
laws of the state of Nevada within 20 days after the posting
of the notice of location, monuments are to be erected at
each corner and in the center of the claim. Within 90 days
after the posting of the notice of location, a discovery shaft
should be driven. After the discovery shaft is driven, the
claimant may then file his claim for record in the office of
the County Recorder. Then after doing the necessary development work and complying with the other requirements under
the law, the filing may ripen into a patent. In this case, the
monuments were placed and the location notices were properly
placed on the monuments. However, it is not disputed that
the four corners were not marked out within 20 days, nor
is it disputed that the discovery shaft was not sunk within
90 days. Attention of the court, however, is called to the testimony of the witness Reynolds that winter set in immediately
after the filing of the location notices. He testified that the
claims were at an elevation of some 8,000 feet and that it
was impossible to even get to the claims during the time that
the snow was on the ground. Obviously, therefore, regardless
of what the statutes provide, it would have been a physical
11
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impossibility to follow through with the marking of the corners
or with the sinking of the discovery shaft within the time
required by the statute. This is the situation that was intended
to be taken care of by Section 1563 from the Compiled Laws
of Nevada, which reads as follows:
"The location and transfers of mining claims heretofore made shall be established and proved in contestation before the courts, by the local rules, regulations, or customs of the miners in the several mining
districts of the territory in which such location and
transfers were made."
Reynolds was qualified as an expert and testified that
he had filed claims in the same mining district and was acquainted with the customs in the area (Tr. 20). He testified
that it was the custom in this area, due to the severe winters,
that the time in which to place the corner markings and
which to sink a discovery shaft was waived during the period
that weather prevented access to the mining property. Such
appears to have been a logical rule, and in fact is the rule that
has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the state of Utah
for this state.
In the case of Brockbank v. Albion Mining Company, 29
Utah 367, the court in discussing this very question stated:
"While the boundaries were not fully marked on
the day the location notice was posted because the
snow then being from 10 to 15 feet deep, it was impractical to do so, still the notice having contained a
full description of the claim by courses and distance
from the discovery monument where it was posted
and the claim being a re-location of one covering the
12
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same ground, the corners of which were yet substantially in place, the location was at least sufficient to
entitle a locator to perfect it within a reasonable time
or before other parties had acquired rights in the
ground."
This case is directly in point with the Brockbank case,
except that in this case it was not a reposting on an earlier
location where the corners had been marked, however, the
full description of the property was contained in the location
notice. Anyone desiring to discover the description could have
done so. In this case, as in the Brockbank case, it was impossible to locate the corners within the time required because
of deep snow. Furthermore, it does not appear that a reasonable time had elapsed after the snow had melted in the spring
and before this contract was signed. It should further be
pointed out that in this case there had been no rights acquired
by other parties. No other claims had been filed on this property. In fact the witness Hintze, himself, after having signed
the contract with Kidder and Mrs. King, went out and refiled
on the property himself in his own name.
In regard to the eSect of mining laws and customs on
filing of claims, the following language is found in 36 Am.
Jur. 331:
"Sec. 76. Miners' Rules and Customs. The recognition accorded by the Act of 1866 to the rules and customs developed by the miners of the West was not
withdrawn when that enactment was superseded, for
the present statute expressly declares that subject to
certain stated requirements, 'the miners of each mining
district may make regulations not in conflict with the
laws of the United States, or with the laws of the state
13
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or territory in which the district is situated, governing
the location, manner or recording, (and) amount of
work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim.'
Since these rules and customs have been adopted in
most of the mining regions of the United States, it is
evident that they constitute a large body of unwritten
law which must be given effect in all cases wherein
they do not conflict with the statutes.
"It is not necessary that a custom be defined in writing, for it may be binding whether written or unwritten. Moreover, customs of this type are to be distinguished from ancient customs of the common lav/,
which, to have force, must be immemorial and continuous."
The authors of Corpus Juris treat the same subject at 58
us Juris Sec, 65, in the following language:
"Sec. 8. At an early day there grew up in the western
and southwestern part of the United States certain customs and usages with respect to mining, and the customs and usages and rules and regulations whereby
rights to mine were initiated and protected and all
rights of liberty and property recognized were generally so fair and equitable that they were ultimately
respected and recognized by the courts and regarded
as the common law of mining. Under the federal
statutes, 30 U.S.C.A. Sec. 28, the miners of each mining district are still authorized to make rules and regulations, not in conflict with the laws of the United
States or with the laws of the state or territory in which
the district is situated, governing the location of claims,
the manner of recording, etc.
"The applicability and effect of particular rules,
regulations, and customs are considered infra Sections
12-96/'
14
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According to Reynolds' testimony, the custom in the
White Pine Mining District, due to the geographical location,
was that the time requirement as to location of corners and
the driving of the discovery shaft was tolled during the period
when the land was inaccessible. This provision is not contrary
to the laws of the United States nor to the laws of the state
of Nevada. Therefore, it clearly appears from the evidence
that the time in which to comply with these requirements
had not expired.
The courts of Nevada very early recognized the effect
of mining customs. Two early cases on this point are Golden
Fleece Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Cable Consolidated Gold
& Silver Mining Co., 12 Nev. 312, and Smith v. North American Mining Co., 1 Nev. 423.
(c) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TIME REQUIREMENTS IN THE LOCATION LAWS DOES NOT WORK
A FORFEITURE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERVENING VALID CLAIM.
The appellant has based his argument on the grounds
that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder failed to comply with the
requirement of marking the corners of the claim and driving a
discovery shaft within the time required by law and has, without citation of authority or without logical reason, jumped
to the conclusion that such alleged failure worked a forfeiture
of any rights of Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder to the unpatented
mining claims. Even if this court were to hold, contrary to
the argument of this respondent in the preceding section, that
the corners had to be marked within 20 days and the dis15
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covery shaft driven within 90 days, and that the local customs
could not be allowed to toll this custom, still there would be
no forfeiture of the rights of King and Kidder. There was
no intervening filing or location between the date that Casselli
placed the location monument and notices and the date of
the contract here in question. The first work done on relocation
of the claims after Casselli located them in the names of Mrs.
King and Mr. Kidder was when the defendant Hintze following the execution of the contract caused them to be located
in his own name.
The following language is found in 58 C.J.S., 143:
"A locator or owner of a mining claim may forfeit
his claim by not complying with the statute requiring
annual labor or improvements to be placed on it, but
the forfeiture becomes complete and effectual only
when another enters on the ground after the expiration
of the time within which the labor may be done, and
completes a relocation before resumption of work
by the original locator, * * * ."
A similar statement is found in 36 Am. Jur. 357, as follows:
"While it is clear that a failure to do the work is
in itself insufficient to affect the locator's title, the
courts concur in holding that a valid relocation after
such failure will completely extinguish his rights/'
There are numerous cases holding that a failure to comply with statutory requirements for the location work within
the time limit does not work a forfeiture in the absence of an
intervening claim. If no claim intervenes, the locator can pick
16
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up where he left off and proceed with his location and assessment work and need not start again from the beginning.
In the case of Oliver v. Burg, 58 Pac. (2d), 245, the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
''A forfeiture does not ensue from the failure to
comply with the law. It requires the intervention of a
third party and a relocation of the ground before any
forfeiture can arise."
The following language is in Whitwell v. Goodsell, 295
Pac. 318:
"While the failure to do the assessment work during
the previous years 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925 left the
ground open to relocation at any time before the owner
resumed work thereon, it did not have the effect of a
forfeiture of the claim. The owner, no right of third
parties having intervened, had a perfect right to do
the assessment work in 1926 and if he did do the assessment work for that year his title is good, not only
against all others but against the government itself,"
In Law v. Fowler, 261 Pac. 667, the Supreme Court of
Idaho stated:
'The last ground for nonsuit is not tenable. If plaintiff had shown herself entitled to the possession of the
Montezuma Claim by reason of a valid location or by
adverse possession for the statutory period, the mere
failure to perform the annual assessment work, in
the absence of a valid subsequent location of part or all
of the same ground, will not work a forfeiture."
See also in this regard:
Rush v. French (Ariz.), 25 Pac. 816.
Emerson v. McWhitter (Calif.) 65 Pac. 1036.
17
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Snowy Peak Mining Co. v. Tamarack & Chesapeake
Mining Co. {Idaho) 107 Vac. 60.
Knutson v. Fredlund (Washington),

106 Pac. 200.

Most of the above cases deal with failure to do assessment
work. However, it appears that the same rule applies to any
stage of the location work. For example, in the California
case of Dripps v. Allison Mines Co., 187 Pac. 448, the claimant failed to record the notice of filing in the time required by
law and the court held that such failure, in the absence of an
adverse filing, did not work a forfeiture of the claim. It appears clear, therefore, that based upon the work which they
had done, Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder retained a property
right in the unpatented mining claims until such right was
cut off by an adverse filing, even if the laws be so construed
as to place Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder in default on their location work.
II. MRS. KING AND MR. KIDDER MADE NO WARRANTY AS TO THE UNPATENTED MINING CLAIMS.
Although we have spent considerable time in this brief
on the proposition that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder did have
a property interest in the unpatented mining claims, the determination of that question is not necessary to the disposition
of this appeal. They conveyed and were required to convey
the unpatented mining claims only by Quit Claim Deed and
made no warranty whatsoever as to such. It is well established
that a Quit Claim Deed implies no warranty of title and
conveys only such title as the grantor has, be that a fee title
or be it nothing at all.
18
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The following language is found at 16 Am. Jur. 625:
'The decisions are in accord in holding that a quitclaim deed passes all the right, title and interest which
the grantor has at the time of making the deed which
is capable of being transferred by deed, unless a contrary intent appears, and nothing more. * * * Where
the grantor has no interest to convey, his quit-claim
will be regarded as merely a release or formal disclaimer, notwithstanding the use of additional words
of grant/'
The authors of Corpus Juris state at 27 C.J.S. page 181:
"A quit-claim deed is one which purports to convey,
and is understood to convey nothing more than the
interest or estate in the property described of which
the grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time,
rather than the property itself."
This matter has likewise been passed upon by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in the case of Nix, et al v. Tooele
County, 118 Pac. (2d) 376. The court stated:
"Plaintiffs' title is founded upon quit-claim deeds.
Such deeds do not imply the conveyance of any particular interest in property. See section 78-1-12, R.S.U.
1933, as compared with section 78-1-11, R.S.U. 1933.
Plaintiffs acquired only the interest of their grantors,
be that interest what it may."
In regard to what is conveyed by a Quit Claim deed, the
appellant has quoted from American Jurisprudence, but has
neglected to state to the court that the sections which he quotes
are under the heading "Provisions for conveyance without
warranty or with special warranty." 55 Am. Jur. 630.
19
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The appellant has attempted to expand the conveyance
of the unpatented mining claims into something more than a
quit claim deed first, by attempting to apply other provisions
of the contract, and secondly, by attempting to show an intent
to give more than a quit claim deed by parol evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. Let
us examine these arguments in the order stated. Paragraph 9
of the contract warrants that there are no outstanding debts,
liens or claims against the property. A reading of the section
in its context will indicate quite clearly that this provision
refers only to the mining lease and option which was the major
element of value being conveyed. Hintze first asserted, but
then abandoned the assertion that there was some default in
the mining lease and option. Had there been, such might have
constituted a defense. However, as stated this provision of the
statute does not apply to the unpatented mining claims. However, even if it should be construed to apply to the unpatented
mining claims, there is no showing of any debts, liens or
claims against these unpatented claims. Certainly there were
no liens against it. The evidence is also clear that there were
no intervening claims filed on these properties. It could not
certainly be the contention of the appellant that the government's revisionary claim to any located property not yet
patented was warranted against. The very use of the term
unpatented mining claims which appears throughout the contract would negative any such construction as this.
Nor does there appear to be anything in the negotiations
surrounding the execution of the contract which would indicate that the quit claim deeds were actually intended to war20
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rant title. It is true that there was some element of value in
the unpatented mining claims. A discovery of open ore showings had been made thereon, although no development work
had been done. Their principal value, however, was as protection to the more valuable working claims which were subject to the lease and to the option.
Immediately upon signing the contract two courses of
action were open to Hintze in regard to the unpatented mining claims. Either he could proceed with the location and development work based upon the monuments and notices of
the location previously filed by Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder,
or he could elect to start over with new location notices. This
latter he elected to do and proceeded to do. It is evident,
therefore, that he considered the quit claim deeds from Mrs.
Kidder to these unpatented mining claims as disclaimers so
that Hintze himself could start over with location and development work which would eventually ripen into a patent. Although Hintze filed the relocation of the claims in his own
name, we must assume, in all fairness to Mr. Hintze, that
at the time he later intended to convey them to the corporation
to be formed.
III. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CONTRACT
ON THE PART OF MRS. KING AND MR. KIDDER.
The assertion of Hintze that he could not form the corporation because of some asserted defect in the unpatented
mining claims has a very hollow ring. As pointed out above,
he first asserted this reason for not performing in his Amended
Answer and Counterclaim filed on the 28th day of April,
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1953, almost three years after the execution of the contract.
In the meantime he had asserted and abandoned various other
alleged reasons for failure to form the corporation. Furthermore, it is obvious that even if Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder
had no interest in the unpatented mining claims, the ability
of Mr. Hintze to form the corporation was not impaired.
By the very fact that the claims were unpatented, Mr. Hintze
must have known that in order for the corporation to realize
the value of such claims it would have to follow through on
location and development work and eventually secure a patent
on these claims. As stated above, rather than to follow through
on the location notices posted the previous fall, Hintze chose
to post new locations in his own name. He was then in the
same position, so far as his ability to follow through and secure
a patent on the land, as he would have been had the defects
in the unpatented claim filings which he alleges to exist not
been present.

CONCLUSION
The points assigned to this court for consideration in
this appeal are entirely without foundation. Hintze was faced
with the fact that he had breached his contract. He found
himself forced to abandon his earlier claim that the mining
lease and option was in default. He then grasped at the straw
of the condition of the unpatented mining claims. As pointed
out above, this is not a defenseFirst: because the time requirements were waived because of
the inclement weather and the work was not in default;
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Second: even if the work were construed as being in default,
no forfeiture resulted because there were no intervening claims;
Third: even if there were no rights in the unpatented claims
in Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder, they made no warranty of title
and so would not be in default; and
Fourth: whatever the defects in the unpatented mining claims
might have been, it did not interfere with the formation of the
corporation for the reason that Hintze immediately proceeded
to relocate said claims in his own name.
The instruction of the trial court that the plaintiffs should
be awarded nominal damages and such compensatory damages
as the jury should find they are entitled to was, therefore, wellfounded.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
721 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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